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Abstract
The paper introduces a notion of complementarity (substitutability) of two signals which
requires that in all decision problems each signal becomes more (less) valuable when the
other signal becomes available. We provide a general characterization which relates com-
plementarity and substitutability to a Blackwell comparison of two auxiliary signals. In
a setting with a binary state space and binary signals, we find an explicit characteriza-
tion that permits an intuitive interpretation of complementarity and substitutability. We
demonstrate how these conditions extend to more general settings.
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1 Introduction
Suppose that two signals are available to a decision maker, and that each signal contains
some information about an aspect of the world that is relevant to the decision maker’s
choice. In this paper we ask under which conditions these two signals are substitutes, and
under which conditions they are complements. Roughly speaking, we mean by this that
the incentive to acquire one signal decreases as the other signal becomes available (in the
case of substitutes), or that it increases as the other signal becomes available (in the case
of complements).
The incentives to acquire signals depend, of course, on the decision for which the
information will be used. When we call signals complements or substitutes in this paper,
then we mean that the conditions described above are satisfied in all decision problems.
Hence we say that signals are substitutes if in all decision problems the value of each signal
decreases as the other signal becomes available. The signals are complements if in all
decision problems the value of each signal increases as the other signal becomes available.
The conditions that we shall provide will thus not refer to any particular decision problem,
but only to the joint distribution of signals, conditional on the various possible states of
the world. We identify features of the joint distribution of signals that are necessary or
sufficient for these signals to be substitutes or complements. Our approach is in the spirit
of Blackwell’s (1951) comparison of the informativeness of signals.
Two examples indicate how signals can be complements in our sense.
Example 1. Signal 1 is the encrypted messages that your enemy’s military commanders
send to each other. Signal 2 is the encryption code. The encryption code is of no value by
itself, unless you also have the messages that were sent. Equally, the messages sent are
of no value by themselves without the encryption code. Together, however, the two signals
are of positive value.1
Example 2. Signal 1 is the weather forecast for tomorrow. Signal 2 is information about
the qualification of the forecaster. Knowing the qualification of the forecaster is of no value
by itself, unless you also have the forecaster’s forecast. But if you have the weather forecast,
then it is potentially valuable to know the qualification of the forecaster. Symmetrically,
the value of the forecast increases if you know the qualification of the forecaster.
1 The following is a special case of Example 1 in which the signal and the state are real numbers:
s = ω + ε, where s is a signal, ω is the state, and ε is random noise that is independent of the state.
Here, ε is the “language” in which s expresses ω, and hence, if we regard ε as a signal, s and ε are
complementary signals.
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A special feature of these two examples is that signal 2 is independent of the infor-
mation that the decision maker is interested in, that is, the decision-relevant state of the
world. Signal 2 only provides information about signal 1. In Example 1, signal 2 pro-
vides the “language” in which signal 1 is expressed. In Example 2, signal 2 provides the
“strength” of signal 1. Therefore, signal 2 has positive value only if the decision maker
also has access to signal 1. Otherwise, it has zero value. This makes the two signals
complements.
Our focus in this paper will be on the case when neither of the two signals is unin-
formative by itself, but instead both signals provide by themselves information about the
state of the world.2 Signals can be complements in this case, too. One result of this
paper shows for a setting in which each signal is informative by itself, with two possible
states of the world, and two possible realizations per signal, that complementary signals
are characterized by a property that is related to a feature of Example 1. The result says
that in the specified setting, signals are complements if and only if there are a state and a
realization of each signal so that if received by themselves, each realization increases the
probability of the state in comparison to the prior, yet if received together, the two signal
realizations decrease the probability of the state. We refer to this as “meaning reversal:”
the meaning of each realization is reversed when received together.
If a signal realization by itself raises the decision maker’s subjective probability of a
state, but if there is a realization of the other signal such that the two signal realizations,
if observed together, lower the probability of that state, then there must be a different
realization of the other signal that has the opposite effect: If observed with the same
realization of the first signal, the decision maker’s probability of the state must be raised in
comparison to the prior.3 Thus, the “meaning” of the realization of the first signal depends
on the realization of the second signal. This is a weaker property than the property that
the first signal provides the “language” in which the second signal is expressed, because in
that case one would expect that the meaning of all realizations of the first signal depends
on the realization of the second signal. By contrast, we obtain this feature only for at
least one realization of the first signal. “Meaning reversal” is restrictive in another way,
however. It requires a particular form of dependence of the meaning of the realization
of one signal on the realization of the other signal: If the second signal by itself has the
2In economic applications it often seems artificial to assume that signals that are entirely uninfor-
mative. For example, it would be contrived to formalize the situation that motivates Dow and Gorton
(1993), and that we describe later in this Introduction, assuming uninformative signals.
3This is because the prior probability is the expected value of the posterior probabilities.
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same meaning as the first signal by itself, then the meaning of the joint realization is the
opposite of the meaning that the two signal realizations have by themselves. Meaning
reversal is thus related to, but different from the main feature of Example 1.4
An example of meaning reversal in the economics literature is provided by Dow and
Gorton (1993). A technology company is observed by two analysts. One analyst learns
whether the company’s lead engineer is leaving the company to create an independent
competitor, and the other learns whether the technology that the engineer is working on
is likely to succeed. If the technology is likely to succeed and the engineer stays, then
this is good news for the company’s value. If the technology is likely to fail, and the
engineer leaves, that is also good news because the company is likely to stay dominant
in its market. However, the remaining cases are bad news about the company’s value,
because either a competitor with a promising technology is created, or because a dubious
project will be continued further. The interpretation of each analyst’s signal may be
reversed by the other analyst’s signal.
The reversal result that we have just illustrated will be shown in this paper for the
setting with two states and two realizations per signal only. However, we also explore
the extent to which it generalizes. We show that in many cases it is necessary for com-
plementarity of signals that the meaning of the realization of one signal can be reverted
by a realization of the other signal. We also show that this condition is in general not
sufficient.
The next example illustrates how signals can be substitutes.
Example 3. Signals 1 and 2 are the advice offered by two advisors. They both work with
the same sources, and will tell you exactly the same thing. Then each of them will have
positive value, but once you have heard what one of them says, you do not derive any
additional benefit from hearing what the other one says.
In the setting with two states and two realizations per signal that we referred to earlier
a property that is related to perfect correlation is necessary and sufficient for signals to
be substitutes. Interestingly, however, this condition is weaker than perfect correlation.
Roughly speaking, it requires that conditional on observing certain realizations of one
signal, the other signal does not provide further information to the decision maker. In the
4In the general model, in which both signals are informative, there is no case of complements that
is similar to Example 2. We explain in Remark 4 below that Example 2 is not robust to perturbations
which introduce a small informational content of signal 2 by itself.
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general setting, with arbitrarily many states and signal realizations, a similar condition
is necessary, but not sufficient for signals to be substitutes.
The results described so far provide interesting, but partial insights into the nature of
the complementarity and substitutability relations among signals. We also offer in this
paper completely general characterizations of complements and substitutes. These results
show that two signals are complements (resp. substitutes) if and only if, among two other
signals that are derived from the two original signals, one dominates the other in the sense
of Blackwell (1951), that is, is more valuable in all decision problems. We thus reduce the
problem of determining whether two signals are complements (resp. substitutes) to the
problem of determining whether among two other signals one Blackwell dominates the
other. This is useful because it allows us to use well-known characterizations of Blackwell
dominance to find out whether two signals are complements (resp. substitutes).
After establishing this general result, the paper’s objective is to obtain characteriza-
tions of complements and substitutes that offer more immediate insights than the general
result does. This leads us to the results outlined earlier in the Introduction. As is well
known, Blackwell comparisons are qualitatively different in the case of two states, and in
the case of three or more states, with the case of two states being much easier to study.
In the same way we find that we have particularly strong results for the case of only two
states, and somewhat weaker result for the general case, as explained above.
Many pairs of signals are neither complements nor substitutes if our definitions are
used. This is because our definitions of these terms require certain conditions to be true
in all decision problems. This is in the spirit of Blackwell’s comparison whose ordering
of signals is incomplete. More signals will satisfy the conditions for being substitutes or
complements if we restrict attention to smaller classes of decision problems. In the context
of Blackwell’s original work this line of investigation has been pursued by Lehmann (1988),
Persico (2000), Athey and Levin (2001) and Jewitt (2007). A similar research agenda is
feasible in our context, and we present in this paper a first step in this direction.
Radner and Stiglitz (1984) consider a setting in which a one-dimensional real parame-
ter indexes the quality of a signal. They show that the value of the signal in any decision
problem is weakly increasing but not everywhere concave as the quality of information
increases. In particular, a non-concavity occurs for any decision problem in the neigh-
borhood of the parameter value for which the signal is uninformative. Non-concavity of
the value of a signal as the quality of the signal improves indicates increasing returns to
scale in information. It may be possible to interpret an improvement in the quality of a
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signal as “making a further signal available,” and one might be able to interpret a non-
concavity of the value of information as a complementarity between an existing signal,
and a further signal that might be made available. We have not yet explored whether we
can make these analogies precise.
The idea that signals may be complements or substitutes has previously appeared in
some applied work. An example is the paper by Sarvary and Parker (1997), who take
consumers’ valuations of signals as exogenously given, and focus on competition among
information providers. Complementarity and substitutability of signals has previously
also been referred to in an auction context by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and in a voting
context complementarity of voters’ information has been emphasized by Persico (2004). In
auction or voting contexts, different signals are held by different individuals, whereas our
paper focuses on a single person decision problem. All papers listed, moreover, consider
complementarity or substitutability in very specific settings, whereas we seek characteri-
zations of signals that are in all decision problems complements or substitutes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides definitions. Section 3 contains
our result on the relation between substitutability, complementarity, and Blackwell com-
parisons. Section 4 studies in detail the special case that there are only two states of
the world. Section 5 investigates the extent to which the findings of Section 4 generalize
when the number of states of the world is arbitrary. In Section 6 we specialize to the case
in which the state of the world is a real number, and the utility function is linear in the
state of the world. The results of Section 4 can be transferred to this setting. Section 7
concludes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Definitions
The state of the world is a random variable ω˜ with realizations ω in a finite set Ω which has
at least two elements. The probability distribution of ω˜ is denoted by pi. Without loss of
generality we assume that each state in Ω occurs with the same probability: pi(ω) = 1/|Ω|
for all ω ∈ Ω.5 Two signals are available: s˜1 with realizations s1 in the finite set S1 where
S1 has at least two elements, and s˜2 with realizations s2 in the finite set S2 where S2 also
5Our results in Sections 3-5 would not be different if the prior was any other distribution with support
Ω. This follows from the relation between our analysis and the Blackwell comparison of signals that
is pointed out in Proposition 1 below, and from the fact that the Blackwell comparison of signals is
independent of the prior as long as the prior has full support. In Section 6, by contrast, the prior
distribution of the state will matter, and we shall then relax the assumption of a uniform distribution.
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has at least two elements. We assume without loss of generality that S1∩S2 is empty. The
joint distribution of signals s˜1 and s˜2 conditional on the state being ω ∈ Ω is denoted by
p12,ω. The probability assigned by this distribution to some realization (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2
is denoted by p12,ω(s1, s2). The unconditional distribution of (s˜1, s˜2) is denoted by p¯12 and
is given by: p¯12(s1, s2) =
∑
ω∈Ω p12,ω(s1, s2)pi(ω) for all (s1, s2) ∈ S1×S2. The probability
distribution on Ω conditional on observing signal realization (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 (where
p¯12(s1, s2) > 0) is denoted by qs1,s2 and is given by:
qs1,s2(ω) = pi(ω)
p12,ω(s1, s2)
p¯12(s1, s2)
for all ω ∈ Ω. (1)
For i = 1, 2 the marginal distribution of signal s˜i conditional on the state being ω ∈ Ω
is denoted by pi,ω. The probability assigned by this distribution to some realization si ∈ Si
is denoted by pi,ω(si). For i = 1, 2 the unconditional distribution of s˜i is denoted by p¯i
and it is given by: p¯i(si) =
∑
ω∈Ω pi,ω(si)pi(ω) for all si ∈ Si. Without loss of generality
we assume that p¯i(si) > 0 for all si ∈ Si. For i = 1, 2 the probability distribution on Ω
conditional on observing signal realization si ∈ Si is denoted by qsi and is given by:
qsi(ω) = pi(ω)
pi,ω(si)
p¯i(si)
for all ω ∈ Ω. (2)
We shall say that signal s˜i is “informative” if there is at least one si ∈ Si such that
qsi 6= pi. We shall say that signal s˜i is “informative conditional on signal realization
sj ∈ Sj” (where j 6= i) if there is at least one si ∈ Si such that qs1,s2 6= qsj . We shall make
the following:
Assumption 1. For every i ∈ {1, 2}, if signal s˜i is not informative, then there is a signal
realization sj ∈ Sj (where j 6= i) such that signal s˜i is informative conditional on signal
realization sj.
This assumption rules out signals that are of no potential use to the decision maker.
To define when the two signals are substitutes or complements we need some auxiliary
definitions.
Definition 1. A decision problem is a pair (A, u) where A is some finite set of actions
and u is a utility function: u : A× Ω→ R.
Definition 2. For given decision problem (A, u):
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• The value of not having any signal is:
V∅(A, u) ≡ max
a∈A
∑
ω∈Ω
(u(a, ω)pi(ω)) . (3)
• For i ∈ {1, 2} the value of having signal s˜i alone is:
Vi(A, u) ≡
∑
si∈Si
p¯i(si) max
a∈A
∑
ω∈Ω
(u(a, ω)qsi(ω)). (4)
• The value of having both signals is:
V12(A, u) ≡
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
p¯12(s1, s2) max
a∈A
∑
ω∈Ω
(u(a, ω)qs1,s2(ω)). (5)
The two key definitions of this paper are:
Definition 3. Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are substitutes if for all decision problems (A, u) we
have:
V1(A, u)− V∅(A, u) ≥ V12(A, u)− V2(A, u) (6)
and
V2(A, u)− V∅(A, u) ≥ V12(A, u)− V1(A, u). (7)
Definition 4. Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are complements if for all decision problems (A, u) we
have:
V12(A, u)− V2(A, u) ≥ V1(A, u)− V∅(A, u) (8)
and
V12(A, u)− V1(A, u) ≥ V2(A, u)− V∅(A, u). (9)
Note that the two inequalities in Definition 3, and also the two inequalities in Definition
4, are equivalent.
For a simple interpretation of the inequalities in Definitions 3 and 4 suppose that the
decision maker’s not explicitly modeled overall utility is additive in the expected utility
from decision problem (A, u) and money. Then the inequalities in Definitions 3 and 4
compare the decision maker’s willingness to pay for signals in different scenarios. For
example, the inequality in Definition 3 says that the willingness to pay for signal s˜1 is
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larger if signal s˜2 is not available than if it is available. It seems natural to call signals
substitutes in this case. Without postulating the existence of money, and additive utility,
one could interpret the inequalities in Definitions 3 and 4 using an idea in von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1953, p. 18). They argue that inequalities that involve differences of
von Neumann Morgenstern utilities reflect differences in the intensity of a preference. For
example, in the case of Definition 3, this interpretation says that the preference for having
signal s˜1 over not having signal s˜1 is more intense when signal s˜2 is not present than when
it is present. This interpretation of the difference of von Neumann Morgenstern utilities
is not universally accepted, however.6
We next offer formalizations of the three examples informally described in the In-
troduction using the framework of this section. It will be obvious that the signals in
Examples 1 and 2 are complements and in Example 3 substitutes.
Example 1. Ω = {a, b}, S1 = {α, β}, S2 = {αˆ, βˆ}. Signal 2 determines the language
that signal 1 uses. If signal 2 has realization αˆ, then signal 1 uses signal realization α
to indicate state a, and signal realization β to indicate state b. If signal 2 has realization
βˆ then the signal 1 uses the reverse language. The code corresponding to αˆ is used with
probability ϕ. Independent of the language, signal 1 indicates the state correctly with
probability ρ ∈ [0.5, 1] and provides an incorrect signal with the remaining probability. We
display the two conditional distributions p12,a and p12,b in Figure 1. Rows correspond to
realizations of signal s˜1, and columns correspond to realizations of signal s˜2.
αˆ βˆ
α ϕρ (1− ϕ)(1− ρ)
β ϕ(1− ρ) (1− ϕ)ρ
αˆ βˆ
α ϕ(1− ρ) (1− ϕ)ρ
β ϕρ (1− ϕ)(1− ρ)
ω = a ω = b
Figure 1: Example 1 (signals are complements)
Example 2. Ω = {a, b}, S1 = {α, β}, S2 = {αˆ, βˆ}. Signal 1 indicates the state correctly
with probability ρ ∈ [0.5, 1] if signal 2 has realization αˆ and it indicates the state correctly
with probability ρˆ ∈ [0.5, 1] if signal 2 has realization βˆ. Signal 1 always uses the code
by which α indicates that the state is a, and β indicates that the state is b. Signal 2 has
6Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 32) regard this interpretation as a fallacy, whereas Binmore (2009, p. 67)
is sympathetic to this interpretation. We return to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s argument in more
detail in Remark 1 below.
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αˆ βˆ
α ϕρ (1− ϕ)ρˆ
β ϕ(1− ρ) (1− ϕ)(1− ρˆ)
αˆ βˆ
α ϕ(1− ρ) (1− ϕ)(1− ρˆ)
β ϕρ (1− ϕ)ρˆ
ω = a ω = b
Figure 2: Example 2 (signals are complements)
αˆ βˆ
α ρ 0
β 0 1− ρ
αˆ βˆ
α 1− ρ 0
β 0 ρ
ω = a ω = b
Figure 3: Example 3 (signals are substitutes)
realization αˆ with probability ϕ ∈ (0, 1). The conditional distributions of the signals are
shown in Figure 2.
Example 3. Ω = {a, b}, S1 = {α, β}, S2 = {αˆ, βˆ}. Each signal indicates the state
correctly with probability ρ ∈ [0.5, 1) and incorrect with the remaining probability. Signals
are perfectly correlated. The code that the signals use is that α and αˆ indicate that the
state is a, and β and βˆ indicate that the state is b. The conditional distributions of the
signals are shown in Figure 3.
3 Connection With Blackwell Dominance
To obtain a general characterization of signals that are complements or substitutes, we
define two auxiliary signals, s˜S and s˜C . Informally, the signal s˜S can be described as
follows. An unbiased coin is tossed. If “heads” comes up, the decision maker is informed
about the realization of s˜1. If “tails” comes up, the decision maker is informed about the
realization of s˜2. Formally, the signal s˜S has realizations in the set SS ≡ S1∪S2.7 For given
state ω ∈ Ω, the probability that s˜S has realization s1 ∈ S1 is pS,ω(s1) ≡ 12p1,ω(s1), and
the probability that s˜S has realization s2 ∈ S2 is pS,ω(s2) ≡ 12p2,ω(s2). The unconditional
distribution of s˜S is denoted by p¯S and is given by p¯S(sS) = pi(ω)
∑
ω∈Ω pS,ω(sS) for all
sS ∈ SS. The conditional distribution on Ω conditional on observing signal realization
7Recall that we assume that S1 ∩ S2 is empty.
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sS ∈ SS is the distribution qsS that was defined in equation (2).
The second auxiliary signal, s˜C , is intuitively constructed as follows. An unbiased coin
is tossed. If “heads” comes up, the decision maker is informed about the realizations of
s˜1 and s˜2. If “tails” comes up, the decision maker receives no information. Formally, the
signal s˜C has realizations in the set SC ≡ (S1 × S2) ∪ {N}. Here, the symbol N denotes
the case that the decision maker receives no information. For given state ω ∈ Ω, the
probability that s˜C has realization (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 is pC,ω(s1, s2) ≡ 12p12,ω(s1, s2), and
the probability that s˜C has realization N is pC,ω(N) ≡ 12 . The unconditional distribution
of s˜C is denoted by p¯C and is given by p¯S(sS) = pi(ω)
∑
ω∈Ω pS,ω(sS) for all sS ∈ SS.
The conditional distribution on Ω conditional on observing signal realization sC ∈ SC is
the distribution qsC that was defined in equation (1) if sC ∈ S1 × S2, and it is the prior
distribution pi if sC = N . We shall write for this distribution also qN .
Definition 5. For given decision problem (A, u) and for k ∈ {S,C}, the value of having
signal s˜k is:
Vk(A, u) ≡
∑
sk∈Sk
p¯k(sk) max
a∈A
∑
ω∈Ω
(u(a, ω)qsk(ω)). (10)
Proposition 1. (i) Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are substitutes if and only if signal s˜S Blackwell
dominates signal s˜C, i.e. in all decision problems (A, u):
VS(A, u) ≥ VC(A, u). (11)
(ii) Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are complements if and only if signal s˜C Blackwell dominates signal
s˜S, i.e. in all decision problems (A, u):
VC(A, u) ≥ VS(A, u). (12)
Proof. For part (i) note that in all decision problems (A, u) the inequality that defines
substitutes, V1(A, u) − V∅(A, u) ≥ V12(A, u) − V2(A, u) is equivalent to: 12(V1(A, u) +
V2(A, u)) ≥ 12(V12(A, u)+V∅(A, u)). But by definition the expression on the left hand side
is the same as VS, and the expression on the right hand side is the same as VC . Thus (i)
follows. The proof of part (ii) is analogous.
Remark 1. This result is related to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1953, p. 18)
discussion of the meaning of comparisons of utility differences to which we alluded before.
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Roughly speaking,8 their argument is as follows. If a, b, c, and d are outcomes, then the
comparison of utility differences u(a) − u(b) > u(c) − u(d) can be inferred from choices
among lotteries because it is equivalent to: 0.5u(a) + 0.5u(d) > 0.5u(b) + 0.5u(c), and
hence to the preference of the lottery that gives a and d each with probability 0.5 over the
lottery that gives b and c each with probability 0.5. This preference can be interpreted as
an expression of an intensity of preferences because it means that, starting from a lottery
that gives b and d each with probability 0.5 the decision maker rather has b be replaced by
a than d by c. Hence the step from b to a seems larger to the decision maker than the step
from c to d. In our setting a, b, c, d are replaced by signals on which the decision maker can
base a choice. Our Proposition 1 is then a formal statement of the way in which choices
among lotteries express, according to von Neumann and Morgenstern, comparisons of
utility differences.
Blackwell and Girshick (1954, Theorem 12.2.2.) offer a variety of characterizations of
Blackwell dominance. A well-known characterization is that one signal Blackwell dom-
inates another if the dominated signal is a garbling of the dominating signal (Theorem
12.2.2., Condition (2), Blackwell and Girshick (1954)). Another condition is that the
posteriors resulting from the dominating signal are a mean-preserving spread of the pos-
teriors resulting from the dominated signal (Theorem 12.2.2., Condition (5), Blackwell
and Girshick (1954)). We now show an example in which this latter condition can be
used to easily verify that signals are complements and substitutes.
Example 4. Ω = {a, b}, S1 = {α, β, γ} and S2 = {αˆ, βˆ, γˆ}. The distributions p12,a
and p12,b are displayed in the same way as in Examples 1-3. Intuitively, in this example
signal s˜1 reveals the state with probability ρ. If signal s˜1 reveals the state, signal s˜2 is not
informative and has realization γˆ. Similarly, signal s˜2 reveals the state with probability
1 − ρ, and if signal s˜2 reveals the state, signal s˜1 is not informative and has realization
γ. To verify that signals are complements and substitutes in Example 4 one can easily
check that s˜S and s˜C imply identical posterior distributions: (
1
2
, 1
2
) with probability 0.5,
and (1, 0) and (0, 1) with probability 0.25 each. Therefore, by the characterization of
Blackwell dominance quoted above, s˜S (weakly) Blackwell dominates s˜C and vice versa,
and by Proposition 1 signals are complements and substitutes.
8Our rendition of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s argument follows Binmore’s (2009, p. 67). Von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s original argument is slightly different, involving only 3 outcomes. In sub-
stance it is the same.
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αˆ βˆ γˆ
α 0 0 ρ
β 0 0 0
γ 1− ρ 0 0
αˆ βˆ γˆ
α 0 0 0
β 0 0 ρ
γ 0 1− ρ 0
ω = a ω = b
Figure 4: Example 4 (signals are complements and substitutes)
4 The Case of Two States
It is easier to verify Blackwell dominance when there are only two states of the world,
and therefore beliefs are one-dimensional, than when there are more than two states of
the world, and therefore beliefs are multi-dimensional. The qualitative difference between
the one-dimensional case and the case of two or more dimensions is explained in Section
12.4 of Blackwell and Girshick. In the one-dimensional case the convex value function9
arising from an arbitrary decision problem can be approximated arbitrarily closely by
linear combinations of a very simple subclass of piecewise linear, convex functions. No
such approximation result is known in the two or more-dimensional case. The relevance
of having a dense class of simple value functions is that one can correspondingly restrict
attention to a simple class of decision problems when checking Blackwell dominance.
The results cited in the previous paragraph, and the close connection between our
concepts and Blackwell dominance shown in the previous section, motivate why we begin
our study here with the case in which there are only two states of the world. We label
them: Ω = {a, b}. The key property of the two states model is that we can restrict
attention to two action decision problems where A = {T,B} and u is given by Figure 5.
ω = a ω = b
T 0 x
B 1− x 0
Figure 5: A two action decision problem
Lemma 1. In the two states model, signals are complements (substitutes) if and only if
9Value functions map posterior beliefs into the expected utility that the decision maker obtains when
holding those beliefs and choosing optimally. Every decision problem gives rise to a convex value function.
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they are complements (substitutes) in all two action decision problems given by Figure 5
with x ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The main argument in the proof of Theorem 12.4.1. in Blackwell and Girshick
(1954) demonstrates that in the two states case a signal s˜ Blackwell dominates another
signal s˜′ if and only if s˜ is more valuable than s˜′ in all two action problems of the form
shown in Figure 5.10 We can then apply Proposition 1 to infer Lemma 1.
4.1 Substitutes
We focus in this subsection on the case that each signal has only two realizations. The
next section will offer a strong characterization of substitutes in the case of arbitrary finite
state and signal spaces. We denote the realizations of signal s˜1 by α and β, and those of
signal s˜2 by αˆ and βˆ. We shall focus on the case that each signal realization individually
is informative, that is, leads to a posterior belief that is different from the prior belief. It
is easy to see that otherwise there can’t be substitutes. This will also be shown in general
in Proposition 5 below. Without loss of generality we assume that observing α or αˆ (resp.
β or βˆ) alone raises the decision maker’s belief that the state is a (resp. b): qα(a) > pi(a)
and qαˆ(a) > pi(a). We refer to the model with two states and two realizations per signal
if it satisfies the assumptions introduced in this paragraph as the “binary-binary” model.
Proposition 2. In the binary-binary model, signals are substitutes if and only if the joint
realizations (α, αˆ) and (β, βˆ) each have strictly positive prior probability, and
qα,αˆ(a) = max{qα(a), qαˆ(a)}, and (13)
qβ,βˆ(b) = max{qβ(b), qβˆ(b)}. (14)
Call a realization of a single signal “extreme” if it provides the strongest evidence
for state a, or state b, among all four individual signal realizations. The conditions in
Proposition 2 say that conditional on an extreme realization of a signal the other signal
is not informative. Thus, in the binary-binary model, substitutability amounts to a form
of conditional uninformativeness of signals.
10Blackwell and Girshick’s proof refers to a decision problem that is as in Figure 5 but with the first
row of payoffs replaced by (−(1 − x), x), where x ∈ (0, 1), and the second row of payoffs replaced by
(0, 0). The same argument that Blackwell and Girshick use can be used to demonstrate that a signal s˜
Blackwell dominates another signal s˜′ if and only if s˜ is more valuable than s˜′ in all two action problems
of the form shown in Figure 5. We omit the details.
13
αˆ βˆ
α ρ ϕ
β µϕ′ µρ′
αˆ βˆ
α ηρ ηϕ
β ϕ′ ρ′
ω = a ω = b
Example 5 (α and β are extreme signal realizations)
αˆ βˆ
α ρ 0
β ϕ 1− ρ− ϕ
αˆ βˆ
α ρ′ 0
β ϕ′ 1− ρ′ − ϕ′
ω = a ω = b
Example 6 (α and βˆ are extreme signal realizations)
Figure 6: Two different types of substitutes
Signal distributions that satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2 can be classified into
two types. For signal distributions of the first type the two extreme realizations are
different realizations of the same signal, whereas for signal distributions of the second
type, the two extreme realizations are realizations of two different signals. We illustrate
these two types in Figure 6.
Example 5 illustrates the first type. We show the case in which both extreme signal
realizations come from signal s˜1. It then has to be the case that, conditional on the
realization of signal s˜1, signal s˜2 is always not informative. This happens if conditional on
any realization of signal s˜1, the likelihood ratios of joint signal realizations are the same
for all realizations of signal s˜2. The corresponding information structure is displayed in
Example 5 where the likelihood ratios are denoted by η and µ which are both less than
1.11 Note that the perfect correlation Example 3 is a special case of Example 5 where
ϕ = ϕ′ = 0, ρ = ρ′ and µρ′ = ηρ = 1− ρ.
Example 6 illustrates the second type of signal distributions that make signals substi-
tutes. In this type, the two extreme realizations come from different signals. We show the
11Of course, the entries in each table in Example 5 have to sum to one. Moreover, since (α, αˆ) and
(β, βˆ) occur with positive probability, we have ρ, ρ′ > 0 while ϕ,ϕ′ ≥ 0. Finally, to satisfy our assumption
that αˆ indicates state a, we need that ρ+ µϕ′ ≥ ηρ+ ϕ′.
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case in which α and βˆ are the extreme realizations. In this case, signals are substitutes if
and only if signal s˜1 is not informative conditional on βˆ, and signal s˜2 is not informative
conditional on α. It is not hard to see that this is equivalent to the realization (α, βˆ)
having zero probability in both states. Accordingly, the information structure is of the
form shown in Example 6.12 Note that our earlier Example 3 is a special case of Example
6 where ϕ = ϕ′ = 0 and ρ′ = 1− ρ.
We prove the sufficiency of the conditions in Proposition 2 in the Appendix. The proof
is by calculation, using the fact that according to Lemma 1 we can restrict attention to
a one parameter class of decision problems with two actions only. We show the necessity
of the conditions in Proposition 2 in the next section, where we shall derive the necessity
from a more general result that is proved using a simple, geometric argument.
Remark 2. Among all pairs of conditional joint distributions of signals s˜1 and s˜2 in the
binary-binary model the ones shown in Figure 6 are rare. One way of saying this formally
is to identify pairs of conditional joint distributions of the two signals with vectors in
8-dimensional Euclidean space, and to endow the set of all joint distributions with the
relative Euclidean topology. The set of distributions that are not like the distributions
in Figure 6 is then an open and dense subset of the set of all joint distributions, and is
thus generic. This is mathematically obvious given Proposition 2. It may also appear
to be intuitively plausible given how stringent the requirement that defines substitutes is,
however, as we will point out below, in the same topological sense, complements, although
their definition seems equally stringent, are not rare.
4.2 Complements
We begin again by considering the binary-binary model introduced in the previous subsec-
tion. Note that our earlier Examples 1 and 2 would be special cases of the binary-binary
model had we not ruled out in the previous subsection the case that at least one of the
signals is not informative. Indeed, it is obvious that, whenever at least one signal by itself
is not informative, signals are complements. We state this simple observation in the next
section as Proposition 9. We now focus on the case that both signals are by themselves
informative.
12In accordance with Proposition 2 we need ρ, ρ′ > 0 and ϕ,ϕ′ ≥ 0. To satisfy our assumption that α
and αˆ indicate state a, we need that ρ ≥ ρ′ and ρ+ϕ ≥ ρ′ + ϕ′. To ensure that α is the strongest signal
for state a we need: ρϕ′ ≥ ρ′ϕ, and finally, to ensure that βˆ is the strongest signal for state b we need:
(1− ρ)ϕ′ ≤ (1− ρ′)ϕ.
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Proposition 3. In the binary-binary model, signals are complements if and only if the
joint realizations (α, αˆ) and (β, βˆ) each have strictly positive probability in at least one
state, and one of the following conditions holds:13
qα,αˆ(a) ≤ pi(a), or (15)
qβ,βˆ(b) ≤ pi(b). (16)
Inequality (15) says that if the decision maker receives signal (α, αˆ) the decision
maker’s posterior probability of state a is less than or equal to the prior pi(a), even though
individually both α and αˆ move the decision maker’s probability of state a above pi(a).
Inequality (16) says that if the decision maker receives signal (β, βˆ) the decision maker’s
posterior probability of state b is not more than the prior pi(b), even though individually
both β and βˆ move the decision maker’s probability of state b above pi(b). In both cases,
two signals which by themselves move the decision maker’s beliefs into one direction,
if received together move the decision maker’s beliefs into the opposite direction. The
“meaning” of these signals is reversed if they are received together.
We prove the sufficiency of the conditions in Proposition 3 in the Appendix. We derive
the necessity in the next section from a more general result. Example 7 shows a class of
complements. If ν > µ, the signal realizations α and αˆ by themselves raise the decision
maker’s belief that the true state is a. If ρ ≤ ϕ, then the joint signal realization (α, αˆ),
by contrast, reduces the decision maker’s probability that the true state is a or leaves it
unchanged.14
Remark 3. Whereas substitutes are rare, as we noted in Remark 2, complements are
not. To express this formally, we again endow the set of all pairs of joint conditional
probability distributions of the two signals with the relative Euclidean topology, and note
that the set of distributions that correspond to complements has an open subset. For
example, a small open ball around a pair of full support distributions that satisfy one of the
13As we note in Remark 5 the two conditions are mutually exclusive. In any particular example, at
most one of them can be true.
14Example 7 captures all conditional joint probability distributions of the two signals in the binary-
binary model for which condition (15) holds, and for which in each state the probabilities of the two signal
realizations (α, βˆ) and (β, αˆ) are the same. (There are, of course, other conditional joint distributions
of the two signals for which signals are complements.) All suitable values for the four parameters in
Example 7 can be found by making choices allowed in the following procedure: First pick ν such that
0 < ν < 1. Then pick µ > 0 such that 2ν − 1 ≤ µ < ν. Then pick ϕ ≥ 0 such that 2ν − 1 ≤ ϕ ≤ µ.
Finally, pick ρ ≥ 0 such that 2ν − 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ϕ.
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α̂ β̂
α ρ ν − ρ
β ν − ρ 1 + ρ− 2ν
α̂ β̂
α ϕ µ− ϕ
β µ− ϕ 1 + ϕ− 2µ
ω = a ω = b
Figure 7: Example 7 (signals are complements)
conditions in Proposition 3 as a strict inequality15 is a subset of the set of all distributions
that correspond to complements. This mathematically trivial fact is intuitively surprising
given how stringent the requirement that defines complements is.
Remark 4. In the Introduction and in Section 2 we provided Examples 1 and 2 as ex-
amples of pairs of signals that are complements. These examples are not special cases of
the binary-binary model because one signal, signal 2, is uninformative by itself. However,
we can perturb the conditional signal distributions in these examples so that signal 2 is
informative. Then we obtain special cases of the binary-binary model. One can verify
that if we perturb Example 1 in this way we obtain a pair of signals that exhibits meaning
reversal in the sense of Proposition 3. By contrast, Example 2 cannot be perturbed so that
it satisfies the meaning reversal condition of Proposition 3. Example 2 is thus not robust.
The intuitive reason for this can be seen when considering decision problems of the type
shown in Figure 5 in the case that the decision maker, when holding the prior belief, is
almost indifferent between the two actions. By choosing x close enough to 0.5 we can
construct a decision problem in which signal 2, even if its informational content is very
small, has positive value by itself. By contrast, signal 1 may be known to be so strong that
no realization of signal 2 can change the decision maker’s optimal choice, and therefore, if
combined with signal 1, signal 2 has zero marginal value. Thus, in this decision problem,
signals are not complements.
Remark 5. The two conditions in Proposition 3, inequalities (15) and (16), are mutually
exclusive. To see this, suppose (15) were true: qα,αˆ(a) ≤ pi(a). Because, by assumption,
qα(a) > pi(a), signal realization (α, βˆ) then must have positive prior probability, and:
qα,βˆ(a) > pi(a). Hence qα,βˆ(b) < pi(b). But because, also by assumption, qβˆ(b) > pi(b),
signal realization (β, βˆ) then must have positive prior probability and: qβ,βˆ(b) > pi(b), i.e.
inequality (16) is false.
15With a suitable choice of parameters in Example 7, condition (15) holds as a strict inequality.
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We generalize the sufficiency part of Proposition 3 to obtain a sufficient condition for
complementarity in the case when signals have arbitrarily many realizations. Let si (resp.
s¯i) be the realization of signal s˜i, which provides the weakest (resp. strongest) support
for state a: qsi(a) = minsi qsi(a) and qs¯i(a) = maxsi qsi(a). Let
x ∈ X ≡ (max{qs1(a), qs2(a)},min{qs¯1(a), qs¯2(a)}) , (17)
that is, x is larger than the smallest posterior probability of a that is induced by any
realization of a single signal, and smaller than the largest posterior probability of a induced
by any realization of a single signal. We partition the set Si of realizations of signal s˜i into
two subsets, depending on whether they induce posterior beliefs qsi(a) that are smaller or
larger than x:
Sβi (x) = {si ∈ Si | qsi(a) ≤ x}, Sαi (x) = {si ∈ Si | qsi(a) > x}. (18)
Now imagine that, instead of observing each realization of signal s˜i, the decision maker
only observes whether a realization is in one of the two partitions. This amounts to
observing a signal with two realizations. We call this binary signal t˜i(x) and denote the
realization of t˜i(x) by t
β
i (x) if si ∈ Sβi (x) and by tαi (x) if si ∈ Sαi (x).
Proposition 4. In the two state case, if for all x ∈ X the signals t˜1(x) and t˜2(x) are
complements, then the signals s˜1 and s˜2 are complements.
Proof. We denote the expected utility that the decision maker receives when maximizing
expected utility in some arbitrary decision problem (A, u) after observing the realization
of t˜i(x) by Vi,x(A, u) and we denote the expected utility that the decision maker receives
when maximizing expected utility in decision problem (A, u) after observing the joint
realization (t˜1(x), t˜2(x)) by V12,x(A, u). Let the auxiliary signals t˜C(x) and t˜S(x) be defined
analogously to s˜C and s˜S, and denote the expected utility that the decision maker receives
when maximizing expected utility in decision problem (A, u) after observing these signals
by VC,x(A, u) and VS,x(A, u).
By Lemma 1 it is sufficient to verify complementarity for the two action problem
of Figure 5 for all x ∈ (0, 1). For x 6∈ X, there is at least one signal s˜i which is not
informative. Hence, signals are obviously complements (see Proposition 9 below). Let
x ∈ X, and let (A, u) for the purposes of this proof be the corresponding two action
decision problem. By Proposition 1, it is sufficient to show that VC(A, u) ≥ VS(A, u).
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To demonstrate this, we begin with two observations. The first observation is that
Vi(A, u) = Vi,x(A, u). This is so since in the two action problem at hand, all that matters
for the decision maker’s optimal action after observing realization si of signal s˜i is whether
the posterior belief qsi(a) is smaller or larger than x. But this is precisely the information
provided by signal t˜i(x). We omit the formal proof. The second observation is that,
evidently, the signal (s˜1, s˜2) is (weakly) more informative than the signal (t˜1(x), t˜2(x)).
Hence, V12(A, u) ≥ V12,x(A, u). Using these two observations, we can deduce:
VC(A, u) = 0.5V12(A, u) + 0.5V∅(A, u)
≥ 0.5V12,x(A, u) + 0.5V∅(A, u)
= VC,x(A, u)
≥ VS,x(A, u) (19)
= 0.5V1,x(A, u) + 0.5V2,x(A, u)
= 0.5V1(A, u) + 0.5V2(A, u)
= VS(A, u),
where the inequality in the fourth line follows because by assumption t˜1(x) and t˜2(x) are
complements. This proves the claim.
To use Proposition 4 in practice one notices that the distribution of t˜1(x) and t˜2(x)
are determined by the underlying distributions of s˜1 and s˜2, and that Proposition 3
characterizes when t˜1(x) and t˜2(x) are complements. The following example illustrates
how Proposition 4 can be applied.
Example 8. Ω = {a, b} and for i = 1, 2: Si = {si1, si2, si3}. The distribution of signals
conditional on the state is shown in Figure 8. Note that for n < m, the realization sin
provides stronger support for state a than the realization sim. Note also that the two signals
are symmetric. There are only two partitions into which realizations can be grouped:
For x ∈ (qsi3(a), qsi2(a)), we have to consider the signals that arise from the partition
{{si3}, {si2, si1}}. And for x ∈ [qsi2(a), qsi1(a)), we have to consider the signals that arise
from the partition {{si3, si2}, {si1}}. The induced signals t˜1(x) and t˜2(x) are described by
the information structures in Figure 9. Observe that in both cases shown in Figure 9, the
signals t˜1(x) and t˜2(x) are complements since condition (15) from Proposition 3 is met.
In Subsection 5.3 we give an example that illustrates that the condition in Proposition
4 is not necessary for complementarity.
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s21 s22 s23
s11 6/100 0 24/100
s12 0 40/100 0
s13 24/100 0 6/100
s21 s22 s23
s11 10/100 0 10/100
s12 0 40/100 0
s13 10/100 0 30/100
ω = a ω = b
Figure 8: Example 8 (signals are complements)
tα2 (x) t
β
2 (x)
tα1 (x) 46/100 24/100
tβ1 (x) 24/100 6/100
tα2 (x) t
β
2 (x)
tα1 (x) 50/100 10/100
tβ1 (x) 10/100 30/100
ω = a ω = b
tα2 (x) t
β
2 (x)
tα1 (x) 6/100 24/100
tβ1 (x) 24/100 46/100
tα2 (x) t
β
2 (x)
tα1 (x) 10/100 10/100
tβ1 (x) 10/100 70/100
ω = a ω = b
Figure 9: Signals t˜1(x) and t˜2(x) for Example 8 and partition {{si3}, {si2, si1}} (top) and
partition {{si3, si2}, {si1}} (bottom)
5 The General Case
As we explained in the previous section, the case that there is an arbitrary finite number
of states is harder to analyze than the case of two states. In our investigation below, the
main results show that the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for substitutes or
complements in the binary-binary model are necessary, but not sufficient, for substitutes
or complements in the general model.
5.1 Substitutes
We begin by considering the case that at least one signal is not informative. The following
result was already anticipated in the previous section.
Proposition 5. If at least one signal is not informative, then signals are not substitutes.
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Proof. Without loss of generality assume that signal s˜1 is not informative. Then V1(A, u)−
V∅(A, u) = 0 in all decision problems (A, u). For signals not to be substitutes, we therefore
need: V12(A, u)− V2(A, u) > 0 for some decision problem (A, u). By Assumption 1 signal
s˜1 is informative conditional on some realization of signal s˜2. Therefore there are s2 ∈ S2
and two s1, s
′
1 ∈ S1 such that p¯12(s1, s2) > 0, p¯12(s′1, s2) > 0, and qs1,s2 6= qs′1,s2 . By the
separating hyperplane theorem there are then a vector r ∈ R|Ω| and a number e ∈ R
such that qs1,s2r > e and qs′1,s2r < e. Consider the decision problem (A, u) in which the
decision maker has two actions: R and E, and in which the payoff to action R in state ω
is given by the ω-th component of r, and the payoff to action E is equal to e in all states
of the world. After observing at least one of the joint realizations (s1, s2) and (s
′
1, s2)
an action that was optimal under qs2 will not be optimal under the posterior following
observation of the joint realization. Therefore, V12(A, u) − V2(A, u) > 0, and signals are
not substitutes.
Assuming that both signals are informative, we showed in the previous section that in
the binary-binary model a necessary and sufficient condition for substitutes is that a signal
is not informative conditional on the other signal having a realization that induces extreme
posteriors. We now show that a similar condition is in general necessary for substitutes.
We begin with a useful auxiliary result. For any subset C of a finite-dimensional Euclidean
space we denote by “co C” the convex hull of C.
Lemma 2. If signals are substitutes, then for every (s1, s2) ∈ S1×S2 such that p¯12(s1, s2) >
0:
qs1,s2 ∈ co {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si} . (20)
Proof. By part (i) of Proposition 1, if signals are substitutes, s˜S Blackwell dominates
s˜C . By condition (5) of Theorem 12.2.2. in Blackwell and Girshick (1954) this means
that the posteriors after observing s˜S are a mean-preserving spread of the posteriors after
observing s˜C . Therefore, the posteriors after observing s˜C are contained in the convex
hull of the posteriors after observing s˜S. This implies Lemma 2.
We now state our main result on substitutes. Recall that an element of a convex set
C is called an “extreme point” of C if it is not a convex combination of two different
elements of C where each of these elements has strictly positive weight.
Proposition 6. Suppose signals are substitutes. If for some i ∈ {1, 2} and some s∗i ∈ Si
the vector qs∗i is an extreme point of co {qsk |k ∈ {1, 2}, sk ∈ Sk}, then signal s˜j (where
j 6= i) is not informative conditional on signal realization s∗i .
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Observe that the condition in Proposition 6 is a generalization of the condition in
Proposition 2. Proposition 2 is for the binary-binary model only, and it shows for that
model that the condition is necessary and sufficient for substitutes. For the general case,
by contrast, Proposition 6 only asserts the necessity of the condition. An example that
we present in subsection 5.3 will show that the condition in Proposition 6 is in general
not sufficient for substitutes.
Proof. Indirect. Suppose qs∗i ,sj 6= qs∗i for some sj ∈ Sj with p¯12(s∗i , sj) > 0. By standard
properties of posteriors qs∗i can be written as a convex combination of the vectors qs∗i ,sj
(sj ∈ Sj). We can infer that qs∗i ,sj 6= qs∗i for at least two sj ∈ Sj with p¯12(s∗i , sj) > 0,
and that both of these vectors qs∗i ,sj receive positive weight in the convex combination
that makes up qs∗i . By Lemma 2 for every sj ∈ Sj with p¯12(s∗i , sj) > 0 the vector qs∗i ,sj
is an element of co {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si}. We have thus inferred that qs∗i can be written
as the convex combination of at least two different elements of co {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2} si ∈ Si}
where each element receives positive weight. Next, one can easily see that this implies
that one can also express qs∗i as the convex combination of exactly two different elements
of co {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si} where each element receives positive weight. This contradicts
our assumption that qs∗i is an extreme point of co {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si} .
The following result adds to Proposition 6 the observation that if signals are substitutes
there are at least two signal realizations to which the condition of Proposition 6 applies.
Corollary 1. Suppose signals are substitutes. Then there are i, j ∈ {1, 2} and s∗i ∈ Si,
s∗j ∈ Sj such that qs∗i 6= qs∗j , k 6= i implies that signal s˜k is not informative conditional on
s∗i , and k 6= j implies that signal s˜k is not informative conditional on s∗j .
Proof. By Proposition 5, if signals are substitutes, at least one signal is informative, and
therefore the set {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si} has at least two elements. Hence co {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2},
si ∈ Si} has at least two extreme points: by the Krein-Milman Theorem (Ok, 2007, p.
659) co {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si} is the closed convex hull of its extreme points, and if it had
only one extreme point, it would therefore have to have only one element. By Milman’s
Converse to the Krein-Milman Theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 660), all extreme points of this set
are elements of {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si}. The result follows from Proposition 6.
We can use Proposition 6 to prove the necessity of the condition in Proposition 2.
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Proof of the Necessity Part of Proposition 2. The necessity of the condition in Proposi-
tion 2 is an immediate consequence of Proposition 6 once we show that the signal re-
alizations (α, αˆ) and (β, βˆ) have strictly positive probability in some state. We prove
this indirectly. Suppose the realization (α, αˆ) had zero probability in both states. Then
p1,ω(α) = p12,ω(α, βˆ) for both ω, and, because each realization of each signal occurs with
strictly positive prior probability: p12,ω(α, βˆ) > 0 for some ω. Hence, the posterior condi-
tional on observing (α, βˆ) is well-defined and we have qα,βˆ(a) = qα(a). Now suppose that
βˆ provides the weakest individual evidence for state a, i.e. qβˆ(a) is an extreme point of
the convex hull of {qsi(a) | i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si}. Then because p12,ω(α, βˆ) > 0 for some
ω, we can apply Proposition 6 and infer that qα,βˆ(a) = qβˆ(a). Hence, the two previous
equalities yield qα(a) = qβˆ(a), a contradiction to our assumption that α indicates state
a, and βˆ indicates b. If, on the other hand, β provides the weakest individual evidence
for state a, then an analogous argument yields the contradiction qαˆ(a) = qβ(a). A similar
argument shows that (β, βˆ) cannot have zero probability in both states.
Clearly, if signals are perfectly correlated, then they are substitutes. In the remainder
of this subsection we ask when the converse is true, i.e. when substitutes need to be
perfectly correlated. We begin by defining perfect correlation formally.
Definition 6. Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are perfectly correlated if there is a one-to-one function
f : S1 → S2 such that
p¯12(s1, s2) > 0⇔ s2 = f(s1). (21)
The following is obvious:
Proposition 7. If signals are perfectly correlated, then they are substitutes.
A converse to this proposition can be proved under additional assumptions.
Proposition 8. Assume:
(i) qsi 6= qs′i for all i ∈ {1, 2} and si, s′i ∈ Si where si 6= s′i;
(ii) qsi /∈ co{qsj |j ∈ {1, 2}, sj ∈ Sj, qsj 6= qsi} for all i ∈ {1, 2} and si ∈ Si.
If signals are substitutes, then they are perfectly correlated.
Assumption (i) in Proposition 8 is mild. It requires that no two different signal real-
izations give rise to the same posterior. Assumption (ii) is more restrictive. It says that
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the posterior qsi resulting from any signal realization si is not contained in the convex
hull of the set of posteriors arising from all signal realizations if one removes from that
set any posterior that is identical to qsi .
Proof. Condition (ii) in Proposition 8 implies that the set of extreme points of co {qsi|
i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si} includes {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si}. On the other hand, by Milman’s
Converse to the Krein-Milman Theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 660), all extreme points of co {qsi|
i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si} are in {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si}. Therefore, the set of extreme points of
co {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si} equals {qsi |i ∈ {1, 2}, si ∈ Si}.
Consider any s1 ∈ S1, and suppose s2 ∈ S2 is such that p¯12(s1, s2) > 0. Then, by
Proposition 6 we have qs1,s2 = qs1 and qs1,s2 = qs2 , and therefore qs1 = qs2 . There must
be at least one such s2 ∈ S2, and by assumption (i) in Proposition 8 there can be only
one such s2 ∈ S2. We define: f(s1) ≡ s2. This can be done for every s1 ∈ S1. The
function f satisfies, by construction, p¯12(s1, s2) > 0 ⇔ s2 = f(s1). The function f is
one-to-one because f(s1) = f(s
′
1) implies by construction qs1 = qs′1 which, by condition
(i) of Proposition 8 implies s1 = s
′
1.
5.2 Complements
We begin again with the case that at least one signal is not informative. For this case,
the following observation is immediate from the definition of complements.
Proposition 9. If at least one signal is not informative, then signals are complements.
In the previous section we showed that a form of “meaning reversal” was necessary and
sufficient for signals to be complements in the binary-binary example. The next result
shows that in general, with more than two states, under an additional assumption meaning
reversal is necessary for complements. Note that, unlike in the case of the binary-binary
model, the result does not assert that meaning reversal is sufficient for complements.
Indeed, in the next subsection we shall show an example where the meaning reversal
condition presented in this subsection is satisfied, and where signals are substitutes.
The following result looks formidable. We unpack the statement of the result for the
reader in the text that follows the result.
Proposition 10. Suppose signals are complements. Consider any r ∈ R|Ω|. Define
e ≡ rpi. If for each i ∈ {1, 2} there is a partition (SEi , SRi ) of Si such that the following
three conditions are satisfied:
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(i) For each i ∈ {1, 2}:
e ≥ rqsi for all si ∈ SEi and e > rqsi for at least one si ∈ SEi , (22)
and
rqsi ≥ e for all si ∈ SRi and rqsi > e for at least one si ∈ SRi ; (23)
(ii) For each k ∈ {E,R} there is at least one (s1, s2) ∈ Sk1 × Sk2 such that
p¯12(s1, s2) > 0; (24)
(iii) For each (k, `) ∈ {(E,R), (R,E)}:
e ≥ rqs1,s2 for all (s1, s2) ∈ Sk1 × S`2 with p¯12(s1, s2) > 0, (25)
or
rqs1,s2 ≥ e for all (s1, s2) ∈ Sk1 × S`2 with p¯12(s1, s2) > 0; (26)
then
rqs1,s2 ≥ e for some (s1, s2) ∈ SE1 × SE2 with p¯12(s1, s2) > 0, (27)
or
e ≥ rqs1,s2 for some (s1, s2) ∈ SR1 × SR2 with p¯12(s1, s2) > 0. (28)
This result indicates in lines (27) and (28) that a form of meaning reversal is a necessary
condition for complementarity. To interpret the result suppose the decision maker wants
to learn from the signals whether the expected utility of a risky action R whose payoffs
are given by the vector r is larger or smaller than the expected utility from a safe action
E that yields payoff e in all states. Assume that r and e are such that with the prior
belief pi the decision maker is indifferent between the two actions. We denote the set
of realizations of signal s˜i which imply a posterior belief for which action E has higher
expected utility than action R by SEi , and we denote the set of realizations of signal s˜i
which imply a posterior belief for which action R has higher expected utility than action
E by SRi . Beliefs for which the decision maker is indifferent can be assigned arbitrarily
to one of these two sets.
Signal realizations in SEi by themselves indicate that the expected value rqsi is not
larger than e. But according to (27) for some joint realization where both realizations
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are in SEi we have (almost
16) the reverse: rqs1,s2 ≥ e. In the same way, (28) is a form of
meaning reversal. At least one of these two meaning reversals must occur according to
Proposition 10.
Note, however, that the meaning reversal is necessary only if conditions (24), (25)
and (26) hold. Among these, (24) is a mild regularity condition. The remaining two
conditions are more restrictive. They refer to the case that the decision maker receives
“mixed messages” from the two signal. There are two possible types of mixed messages:
the first type is when s1 is in S
E
1 but s2 is in S
R
2 ; the second type is when s1 is in S
R
1 but
s2 is in S
E
2 . The conditions require that for each of the two types of mixed signals one
can say unambiguously which signal is “stronger,” irrespective of the specific realization
of the signals. Thus either for all mixed realizations of the first type the expected value of
action E is at least as large as that of action R, and hence signal s˜1 is stronger, or for all
mixed realizations of the first type the expected value of action R is at least as large as
that of action E, and hence signal s˜2 is stronger. An analogous condition needs to hold
for all mixed realizations of the second type, but it is not necessary that the same signal
is stronger for mixed realizations of both types.
Proof. Indirect. Assume for some r ∈ R|Ω| and e ∈ R there were partitions (SEi , SRi ) (for
i ∈ {1, 2}) that satisfy the conditions (i)-(iii) of the Proposition, but neither (27) nor (28)
were true. Consider the decision problem with two actions, R and E, where the payoff
of action R in state ω is given by the ω-th component of r, and the payoff of action E is
equal to e in all states of the world. For an arbitrary belief q the expected payoff of action
R is rq, and the expected payoff of E is e. By assumption, the prior pi is such that rpi = e,
that is, the agent is indifferent between the two actions based on the prior. We shall show
that the signals are not complements in this decision problem. For the remainder of this
proof, (A, u) will denote this particular decision problem.
Suppose for (k, `) = (E,R) condition (25) were true, and for (k, `) = (R,E) condition
(26) were true. Together with the assumption that neither (27) nor (28) are true, we
can deduce that, conditional on observing any joint signal realization (s1, s2), one optimal
action for the decision maker is E whenever s1 ∈ SE1 , independent of the realization
of signal s˜2, and R whenever s1 ∈ SR1 , again independent of the realization of signal
s˜2. Therefore, V12(A, u) − V1(A, u) = 0. On the other hand, the strict inequalities in
conditions (22) and (23), applied to i = 2, imply that V2(A, u) − V∅(A, u) > 0. Thus,
16Ignoring the possibility of indifference.
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signals are not complements. The case that for (k, `) = (E,R) condition (26) is true, and
for (k, `) = (R,E) condition (25) is true, is analogous, with the roles of signals 1 and 2
swapped.
Now consider the case that for both admissible (k, `) condition (25) holds. We shall
calculate V1(A, u)−V∅(A, u) and V12(A, u)−V2(A, u). To calculate these value differences
we recall that a positive marginal value from a signal arises only when the signal changes
the decision maker’s optimal choice. As the prior makes the decision maker indifferent,
we can pick the decision maker’s choice when holding the prior as is convenient for our
proof. We pick it to be R. Then we have:
V1(A, u)− V∅(A, u) =
∑
s1∈SE1
p¯1(s1)(e− rqs1) (29)
=
∑
s1∈SE1
∑
s2∈S2:
p¯12(s1,s2)>0
p¯12(s1, s2)(e− rqs1,s2), (30)
where the second line equals the first because the expected value of the posterior belief
conditional on the realizations of both signals is the posterior belief conditional on the
realization of signal s˜1. Focusing again on signal realizations that change the set of optimal
choices for the decision maker we also calculate:
V12(A, u)− V2(A, u) =
∑
s1∈SE1
∑
s2∈SR2 :
p¯12(s1,s2)>0
p¯12(s1, s2)(e− rqs1,s2). (31)
This equation follows from the assumption that (25) holds for both admissible (k, `) and
that neither (27) nor (28) are true. Subtracting (31) from (30), we find:
V1(A, u)− V∅(A, u)− (V12(A, u)− V2(A, u))
=
∑
s1∈SE1
∑
s2∈SE2 :
p¯12(s1,s2)>0
p¯12(s1, s2)(e− rqs1,s2). (32)
By condition (24), applied to k = E, in Proposition 10, the sum on the right hand side of
the last equality is over at least one pair (s1, s2). Moreover, because (27) does not hold for
any (s1, s2) ∈ SE1 × SE2 , this sum is negative, and therefore signals are not complements.
The remaining case, when for both admissible (k, `) condition (26) holds, is analogous,
with the optimal choice under the prior taken to be E.
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Remark 6. For the case of two states, we have a sufficient condition for complements in
Proposition 4, and a necessary condition for complements in Proposition 10. The example
in Subsection 5.3 will show that neither of these results is a complete characterization, that
is, the sufficient condition is not necessary, and the necessary condition is not sufficient.
For the case of more than two states we only have the necessary condition for complements
of Proposition 10, and we don’t have a general sufficient condition. It is interesting to
observe that the proof of Proposition 10 makes reference only to choice problems in which
there are only two actions. The condition in Proposition 10 would therefore even be
necessary if we required signals to satisfy the complementarity inequality only in all two
action choice problems. One way in which one could try to find a more restrictive necessary
condition would be to consider arguments involving decision problems with more than two
actions.
Proposition 10 has the following corollary that provides a necessary condition that is
easier to check than the necessary condition in Proposition 10 because no reference is made
to the vector r and the number e. Instead, a condition is provided under which a suitable
vector r and a number e can be constructed. The proposition’s necessary condition does
not make the connection with meaning reversal obvious. This is why we have first stated
Proposition 10.
Corollary 2. If signals are complements, then for every signal realization (s′1, s
′
2) with
p¯12(s
′
1, s
′
2) > 0 we have:
pi ∈ co {qs1,s2|(s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 \ {(s′1, s′2)} and p¯12(s1, s2) > 0} . (33)
Proof. The proof is indirect. Denote the convex hull to which the corollary refers by C
and suppose pi /∈ C. Then there is a hyperplane through pi that does not intersect with
C. Let r be the orthogonal vector of this hyperplane, and define e ≡ rpi. We can choose
r such that rq < e for all q ∈ C. We now show that with this choice of r and e the
necessary condition of Proposition 10 is violated. For i = 1, 2 define SEi ≡ Si \ {s′i} and
SRi ≡ {s′i}. We first verify conditions (22) and (23) of Proposition 10. Let i ∈ {1, 2}
and j 6= i. Because for every si ∈ SEi and every sj ∈ Sj we have: qsi,sj ∈ C, we can
conclude: rqsi,sj < e. Because qsi is a convex combination of qsi,sj for sj ∈ Sj, this
implies: rqsi < e, and thus (22) holds. Now consider qs′i . If this belief satisfied: rqs′i ≤ e,
then we could infer rpi < e, because pi is a convex combination of qsi for si ∈ Si, which
28
contradicts e = rpi. Therefore: rqs′i > e, which verifies (23). Next, we note that (24)
holds by construction, and that also by construction (25) is true for both (k, `). On the
other hand, (27) and (28) are violated by construction. Thus, Proposition 10 implies that
signals are not complements.
We now use Corollary 2 to derive the necessity part of Proposition 3.
Proof of the Necessity Part of Proposition 3. We begin by proving that p¯12(α, αˆ) > 0 and
p¯12(β, βˆ) > 0. The proof is indirect. Suppose first that both probabilities were zero.
Then the signals would be perfectly correlated, and therefore not be complements. Next
suppose p¯12(α, αˆ) = 0 but p¯12(β, βˆ) > 0. Because α and αˆ occur with strictly positive
prior probability probability, we have to have: p¯12(α, βˆ) > 0 and p¯12(β, αˆ) > 0. Because
α and αˆ indicate that the state is more likely to be a, it must be that qα,βˆ(a) > pi(a) and
qβ,αˆ(a) > pi(a). But then the condition of Corollary 2 is violated if we take (s
′
1, s
′
2) to be
(β, βˆ). A symmetric argument applies if p¯12(α, αˆ) > 0 and p¯12(β, βˆ) = 0. We conclude
that (α, αˆ) and (β, βˆ) have strictly positive prior probability.
We now prove that qα,αˆ(a) ≤ pi(a) or qβ,βˆ(b) ≤ pi(b). The proof is indirect. Suppose
qα,αˆ(a) > pi(a) and qβ,βˆ(b) > pi(b). (34)
We begin with the case that the two mixed realizations (α, βˆ) and (β, αˆ) both have strictly
positive prior probability so that posteriors conditioning on these signal realizations are
well-defined. We go through different possible orderings of the posterior beliefs, and
show that none of them is compatible with signals being complements. Consider first the
following two cases:
qα,βˆ(a) ≥ pi(a) and qβ,αˆ(a) ≤ pi(a), (35)
qα,βˆ(a) ≤ pi(a) and qβ,αˆ(a) ≥ pi(a). (36)
Condition (35) together with (34) implies that in the decision problem of Figure 5 with
x = 0.5 = pi(a), which we shall denote by (A, u) in this proof, the marginal value of
signal s˜2 conditional on signal s˜1 is zero for both signal realizations of signal s˜1. Thus,
V12(A, u)−V1(A, u) = 0, and signals are not complements (note that V2(A, u)−V∅(A, u) >
0 by the assumption that signal s˜2 is informative and x = 0.5.) For ordering (36) the
argument is the same with the roles of signals 1 and 2 swapped.
29
We are left with the orderings
qα,βˆ(a) > pi(a) and qβ,αˆ(a) > pi(a), (37)
qα,βˆ(a) < pi(a) and qβ,αˆ(a) < pi(a). (38)
If (37) holds in combination with (34), the necessary condition in Corollary 2 is violated
if we choose (s′1, s
′
2) = (β, βˆ), and if (38) holds in combination with (34), the necessary
condition in Corollary 2 is violated if we choose (s′1, s
′
2) = (α, αˆ).
It remains to discuss the cases in which at least one of (α, βˆ) and (β, αˆ) does not have
strictly positive prior probability. Suppose first that both realizations (α, βˆ) and (β, αˆ)
have zero prior probability. This means that signals are perfectly correlated and therefore
the marginal value of a signal when the other signal is available is zero. Hence, signals
are not complements. Suppose next that (α, βˆ), but not (β, αˆ) has zero probability.
If qβ,αˆ(a) ≤ pi(a), then the same argument as for ordering (35) can be used, and if
qβ,αˆ(a) ≥ pi(a), the same argument as for ordering (36) can be used. For the remaining
case that (β, αˆ), but not (α, βˆ) has zero probability, the argument is analogous.
5.3 A Counterexample
In this subsection we present an example that shows that the conditions in Proposition 6
for substitutes and Proposition 10 for complements are only necessary, but not sufficient.
The example also shows that the sufficient conditions for complements in Proposition 4
are not necessary for complements.
Example 9 is shown in Figure 10.17 The example is a two state example: Ω = {a, b}.
Each individual signal s˜i has two informative realizations: αi, βi, and two not informative
realizations: σi, σ
′
i. Among all individual and joint signal realizations, the posterior
belief that the state is a can take on only three values: it equals 1/(1 + λ) > 1/2 for
the realizations αi, (σ1, σ2), (σ
′
1, σ
′
2); it equals 1/2 for the realizations σi, σ
′
i; and it equals
λ/(1 + λ) < 1/2 for the realizations βi, (σ1, σ
′
2), (σ
′
1, σ2).
Lemma 3. In Example 9 signals are substitutes if 2ϕ ≤ ρ and complements if 2ϕ ≥ ρ.
Proof. Individually, a signal is informative with probability (1 + λ)ρ. If it is informative,
it induces the same posteriors as a signal with likelihood ratios 1/λ and λ. Therefore, the
17To ensure that all probabilities are non-negative and sum to one, we have to choose the parameters
ρ, ϕ, λ ∈ (0, 1) such that (1 + λ)(ρ+ 2ϕ) = 1.
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α2 σ2 σ
′
2 β2
α1 ρ 0 0 0
σ1 0 ϕ λϕ 0
σ′1 0 λϕ ϕ 0
β1 0 0 0 λρ
α2 σ2 σ
′
2 β2
α1 λρ 0 0 0
σ1 0 λϕ ϕ 0
σ′1 0 ϕ λϕ 0
β1 0 0 0 ρ
ω = a ω = b
Figure 10: Example 9 (signals are substitutes if 2ϕ ≤ ρ and complements if 2ϕ ≥ ρ)
marginal value of an individual signal is the same as the marginal value of a signal with
likelihood ratios 1/λ and λ multiplied by the probability (1 + λ)ρ.
Conditional on being informative, signals are perfectly correlated. Therefore, if one
signal is available and is informative, then the other signal’s marginal value is zero. On
the other hand, if one signal is available and not informative, the other signal induces
the same posteriors as a signal with likelihood ratios 1/λ and λ. Therefore, the marginal
value of a signal given the other signal is already available is the same as the marginal
value of a signal with likelihood ratios 1/λ and λ multiplied by the probability that the
other signal is not informative, which is 1− (1 + λ)ρ.
It follows that signals are substitutes if and only if 1− (1 +λ)ρ ≤ (1 +λ)ρ, and signals
are complements if and only if 1− (1 + λ)ρ ≥ (1 + λ)ρ. With (1 + λ)(ρ+ 2ϕ) = 1, these
conditions are equivalent to 2ϕ ≤ ρ resp. 2ϕ ≥ ρ.
We shall now show that the example satisfies, for all parameter combinations, the
necessary conditions in Proposition 6 for substitutes and Proposition 10 for complements.
We shall thus show that neither set of conditions is sufficient. Consider first the conditions
in Proposition 6. The realizations of signal s˜i which individually induce the most extreme
posteriors are αi and βi. Conditional on such an extreme realization, signals are perfectly
correlated. In particular, once an extreme realization is observed, no realization of the
other signal changes the decision maker’s belief. This means that the necessary condition
for substitutes in Proposition 6 is met for both signals s˜i. However, for 2ϕ > ρ, signals
are not substitutes.
Next, we show that the example satisfies all conditions of Proposition 10. It is easy
to see that for any r and e for which some partition of S1 and S2 satisfies condition (i) of
Proposition 10, the equation rq ≥ e is equivalent to q(a) ≥ 0.5 or q(a) ≤ 0.5. Without
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loss of generality we assume it is equivalent to q(a) ≥ 0.5. For each of the two sets
Si there are four partitions that satisfy condition (i) of Proposition 10. We must have
αi ∈ SRi and βi ∈ SEi , but σi and σ′i can each be allocated to either of the two sets. This
yields 16 pairs of partitions, all of which satisfy condition (ii) of Proposition 10. One can
check that condition (iii) is violated by the two pairs of partitions for which σi and σ
′
i
are both in SEi for some i ∈ {1, 2} and σj and σ′j are both in SRj for j 6= i. Ignoring
these two cases, one can check that in all other cases there is some meaning reversal.
For example, if SR1 = {α1, σ1}, SE1 = {σ′1, β1}, SR2 = {α2, σ′2}, and SE2 = {σ2, β2}, then
meaning reversal occurs for the signal realizations (σ1, σ
′
2). This shows that the example
satisfies the necessary condition for complementarity in Proposition 10. However, for
2ϕ < ρ, signals are not complements.
The example also demonstrates that the sufficient condition in Proposition 4 for com-
plementarity is not necessary. To see this, pick some x such that λ/(1+λ) < x < 0.5, and
note that Sαi (x) = {αi, σi, σ′i} and Sβi (x) = {βi} for i = 1, 2. The information structure
for the derived signals t˜1(x) and t˜2(x) is shown in Figure 11. Observe that t˜1(x) and t˜2(x)
are perfectly correlated and therefore are not complements.
tα2 (x) t
β
2 (x)
tα1 (x) 1− λρ 0
tβ1 (x) 0 λρ
tα2 (x) t
β
2 (x)
tα1 (x) 1− ρ 0
tβ1 (x) 0 ρ
ω = a ω = b
Figure 11: Signals t˜1(x) and t˜2(x) for Example 9 and partition {{σ′i, σi, αi}, {βi}}
6 Linear Decision Problems
Many pairs of signals are neither complements nor substitutes. This is because the require-
ments that define complementarity and substitutability are stringent in that they require
the complementarity or substitutability inequalities to hold in all decision problems. In
applications, only subclasses of decision problems might be of interest. Restricting at-
tention to subclasses of decision problems gives rise to notions of complementarity or
substitutability that apply to more pairs of signals. In the literature on the Blackwell
comparison of the informativeness of signals, the parallel line of research has been pur-
sued by Lehmann (1988), Persico (2000), Athey and Levin (2001), and Jewitt (2007).
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These authors restrict attention to decision problems where states and actions are real
numbers. Only decision problems for which the utility function u satisfies some form of
monotonicity, for example a single crossing condition, are considered. These authors then
provide informativeness comparisons for real valued signals that are assumed to satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio condition. In particular, Jewitt (2007, Propositions 1, 3,
and 4) shows that informativeness comparisons in this restricted set-up are equivalent to
Blackwell comparisons that are carried out for each pair of possible states, pretending in
each case that these two states were the only possible states of the world. Our insights
into complementarity and substitutability in the case of only two states can therefore be
extended to settings with more than two states if one restricts attention to the same class
of decision problems as the authors quoted above do, and if one makes use of the close
relation between complementarity, substitutability, and Blackwell comparisons. However,
to proceed along these lines one needs to impose conditions on the joint conditional distri-
bution of signals that ensure that both auxiliary signals that were constructed in Section
3 satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio condition. The investigation of such conditions
goes beyond the scope of this paper.
We focus instead on a different subclass of decision problems, linear decision problems,
for which we can extend our results without strong conditions for the signal distributions.
We assume that states, though not necessarily signals, are real numbers, and we only
consider decision problems where the utility function is linear in the state. This is satisfied,
for example, if the state corresponds to the value of some object, actions correspond to
bids or purchase decisions, and utility is additive in the value of the object and money.
Our results in this section will show that complementarity or substitutability in the linear
model is equivalent to complementarity or substitutability in an auxiliary model in which
there are only two states, and in which utility functions are unrestricted. Therefore, our
earlier analysis of the two state case can be extended in a straightforward way to obtain
an analysis of substitutability and complementarity in linear decision problems.
An important conceptual feature of the analysis that follows is that it depends on
the prior distribution pi over the state space Ω. In the linear model, signals that are
complements or substitutes for one prior need not be complements or substitutes for
some other prior. This is different from the case in which we allow all possible utility
functions, as in the previous sections. In that case the prior can be fixed, but which prior
is chosen does not affect the analysis. These considerations motivate the reference to the
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prior distribution in the following definition.18
Definition 7. Suppose Ω is a finite subset of R, and suppose ω ≡ min Ω = 0 and
ω¯ ≡ max Ω = 1. Let pi be a prior distribution over Ω. Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are linear
substitutes given pi if for all decision problems (A, u) such that for any given a ∈ A the
utility function u(a, ω) is a linear function of ω we have:
V1(A, u)− V∅(A, u) ≥ V12(A, u)− V2(A, u). (39)
Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are linear complements given pi if for all decision problems (A, u) such
that for any given a ∈ A the utility function u(a, ω) is a linear function of ω we have:
V12(A, u)− V2(A, u) ≥ V1(A, u)− V∅(A, u). (40)
Now consider some arbitrary signal s˜ with realizations in the finite set S. We shall
associate with s˜ another, auxiliary signal sˆ that is defined in an auxiliary model with only
two states, ω = 0 and ω¯ = 1, and which has realizations in the same finite set S in which
also the realizations of s˜ are contained. To specify this auxiliary model we thus have
to specify the prior probabilities pˆi(ω) and pˆi(ω¯) of the two states, and the conditional
probabilities pˆω(s) and pˆω¯(s) of all signal realizations s ∈ S. We shall specify these below.
We shall then apply this construction of an auxiliary signal to the particular case that
the signal s˜ is (s˜1, s˜2) to obtain an auxiliary signal (sˆ1, sˆ2). Our main result will be that
s˜1 and s˜2 are linear substitutes given a prior pi if and only if sˆ1 and sˆ2 are substitutes,
and that an analogous result holds for complements.
We now construct the auxiliary signal sˆ. We denote by E[ω˜] the expected value of ω˜,
and we denote by E[ω˜|s] the expected value of ω˜ conditional on some signal realization
s. We set Ωˆ = {ω, ω¯}, we specify the prior probabilities pˆi as follows:
pˆi(ω¯) = E[ω˜] and pˆi(ω) = 1− E[ω˜], (41)
and we define the conditional signal probabilities by setting for any s ∈ S:
pˆω¯(s) =
∑
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)ω]
E[ω˜]
and pˆω(s) =
∑
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)(1− ω)]
1− E[ω˜] . (42)
18The assumption in this definition that min Ω = 0 and max Ω = 1 is a normalizing assumption that is
without loss of generality.
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It is easy to verify that these are non-negative numbers whose sum is 1.
By construction, the prior expected value of the state in the auxiliary model is the
same as in the original model. The next lemma shows that the auxiliary signal that we
have constructed also induces the same distribution of conditional expected values of ω˜
as the original signal.
Lemma 4. For every signal realization s ∈ S: (i) the prior probability of observing signal
realization s is in the auxiliary model the same as it was in the original model; and (ii)
the conditional expected value of the state, conditional on observing signal realization s,
is in the auxiliary model the same as it was in the original model.
Proof. To prove (i), note that in the auxiliary model the prior probability of observing s
is:
pˆi(ω¯)pˆω¯(s) + pˆi(ω)pˆω(s)
= E[ω˜]
∑
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)ω]
E[ω˜]
+ (1− E[ω˜])
∑
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)(1− ω)]
1− E[ω˜]
=
∑
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)] , (43)
which is equal to the prior probability of observing s in the original model.
To prove (ii), note that in the auxiliary model the conditional expected value of the
state is:
pˆi(ω¯)pˆω¯(s)∑
ω∈Ωˆ
pˆi(ω)pˆω(s)
=
E[ω˜]
P
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)ω]
E[ω˜]∑
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)]
=
∑
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)ω]∑
ω∈Ω
[pi(ω)pω(s)]
= E[ω˜|s], (44)
where we use the assumption that ω = 0 and ω¯ = 1.
In the particular case in which signal s˜ is equal to (s˜1, s˜2), the above construction
yields an auxiliary signal (sˆ1, sˆ2) with realizations in S1 × S2. We denote the signals
that result if the decision maker observes only the first, or only the second, of the two
components of the auxiliary signal by sˆ1 and sˆ2. Since equation (42) is additive in the
conditional probabilities pω(s), sˆi and the auxiliary signal associated with s˜i have the same
distribution conditional on each state. Consequently, (sˆ1, sˆ2), sˆ1 and sˆ2 induce the same
distribution of conditional expected values of the state as (s˜1, s˜2), s˜1 and s˜2. In addition,
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when utility is linear, the decision maker’s expected utility of any action only depends on
the expected value of the state ω and not on any other feature of the distribution of ω.
This explains the main result of this section.
Proposition 11. Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are linear substitutes given pi if and only if the aux-
iliary signals sˆ1 and sˆ2 are substitutes. Signals s˜1 and s˜2 are linear complements given pi
if and only if the auxiliary signals sˆ1 and sˆ2 are complements.
Remark 7. Proposition 11 refers to signals s˜1 and s˜2 as linear complements or substitutes
given the prior pi, but refers to signals sˆ1 and sˆ2 as complements and substitutes without
reference to a prior. This is because in the auxiliary two state model all utility functions
are linear with respect to the state, and therefore there is no difference between linear
complementarity or substitutability, and complementarity or substitutability in the sense
of the previous sections. Moreover, as was emphasized before, the complementarity and
substitutability notions of the previous section are independent of the prior. Note that the
prior pi does, of course, enter into the definition of signals sˆ1 and sˆ2
Proof. Consider any decision problem (A, u) where u is linear in ω. There is a related
decision problem (Aˆ, uˆ) in the auxiliary model where the action set is Aˆ = A, that
is, the same as in the original decision problem, and where the utility function uˆ is
obtained from the utility function u in the original model by setting uˆ(a, ω) = u(a, ω)
and uˆ(a, ω) = u(a, ω) for any a ∈ Aˆ. Thus, uˆ is the restriction of u to A × {ω, ω¯}. For
every decision problem (A, u) there is thus a corresponding decision problem (Aˆ, uˆ), but
observe also that, vice versa, for every given decision problem (Aˆ, uˆ), there is a unique
corresponding decision problem (A, u) such that u is linear in ω.
Denote by Vˆ∅(Aˆ, uˆ) the decision maker’s expected utility when choosing optimally in
the auxiliary model with no information, for i = 1, 2, denote by Vˆi(Aˆ, uˆ) the decision
maker’s expected utility when choosing optimally after observing the realization of sˆi in
the auxiliary model, and denote by Vˆ12(Aˆ, uˆ) the decision maker’s expected utility when
choosing optimally after observing the realization of (sˆ1, sˆ2) in the auxiliary model. Our
proof strategy is to show:
Vˆ∅(Aˆ, uˆ) = V∅(A, u), Vˆi(Aˆ, uˆ) = Vi(A, u) (for i = 1, 2), Vˆ12(Aˆ, uˆ) = V12(A, u). (45)
This equation immediately implies that the same inequalities that determine whether s˜1
and s˜2 are complements or substitutes also determine whether sˆ1 and sˆ2 are complements
or substitutes, and thus proves the result.
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To prove our claims we observe first that, when utility is linear, the decision maker’s
expected utility only depends on the expected value of the state ω˜, not on the distribution
of ω˜. Therefore, Lemma 4 (ii) implies that, when maximizing expected utility in decision
problem (A, u) conditional on some signal realization s, the decision maker obtains the
same maximal expected utility in the auxiliary model using the auxiliary signal as he
obtained in the original model using the original signal. Second, Lemma 4 (i) says that
all signal realizations s have the same prior probability in the auxiliary model as in
the original model. Because the ex ante expected utilities to which we refer above are
calculated as the sum over all signal realizations of the probability of that signal realization
times the maximal expected utility obtainable after observing that signal realization, our
assertion follows.
As a consequence of this proposition, we can check whether any two signals are linear
complements or linear substitutes by checking complementarity and substitutability, re-
spectively, in an associated two state model. For this latter purpose we can use the results
of Section 4 for two state models. Consider, for instance, a linear model in which indi-
vidual signals each only have two possible realizations: S1 = {α, β} and S2 = (αˆ, βˆ}, and
assume that E[ω˜|α] > E[ω˜|β] and E[ω˜|αˆ] > E[ω˜|βˆ]. Then we can infer from Proposition 2
that signals are substitutes if and only if (α, αˆ) and (β, βˆ) each have strictly positive prob-
ability and E[ω˜|(α, αˆ)] = max{E[ω˜|α], E[ω˜|αˆ]} and E[ω˜|(β, βˆ)] = min{E[ω˜|β], E[ω˜|βˆ]}.
Similarly, we can infer from Proposition 3 that signals are complements if and only if
(α, αˆ) and (β, βˆ) each have strictly positive prior probability and E[ω˜|(α, αˆ)] ≤ E[ω˜] or
E[ω˜|(β, βˆ)] ≥ E[ω˜]. Intuitively, one obtains characterizations in terms of conditional ex-
pected values of the state because in the auxiliary model, where the state is either 0 or 1,
the conditional probabilities equal conditional expected values, and because conditional
expected values in the auxiliary model equal conditional expected values in the original
model by part (ii) of Lemma 4.
7 Conclusion
This paper has provided some insights into the nature of substitutability and comple-
mentarity relations among signals. Our most general conditions for substitutability and
complementarity in the case that there are more than two states are only necessary, not
sufficient, and therefore give us only a partial description of signals that are substitutes
or complements. As the necessary condition for substitutes is obviously very restrictive,
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whereas the necessary condition for complements is not obviously as restrictive, perhaps
the most intriguing open question is how large the class of complements is if there are
more than two states. As explained in Section 6, a further study of complementarity and
substitutability in the case that attention is restricted to decision problems in which the
decision maker’s utility function satisfies some monotonicity condition seems also feasible.
A further line of work is to pursue the implications of complementarity and substi-
tutability in economic settings. In this context it is interesting that complementarity and
substitutability of signals may not only matter in single person decision problems, but also
in games when agents hold private signals, and each agent’s preferences depend on all sig-
nal realizations, that is, in contexts with interdependent preferences. Such contexts arise
naturally in auctions or in voting games. It seems worthwhile to explore the implications
of complementarity and substitutability in those contexts. Finally, complementarity of
signals may also matter when agents acquire signals sequentially. In this case, the second
signal may be acquired when the agent already knows the realization of the first signal.
By contrast, in our setting, each signal is acquired without knowing the realization of the
other signal. Extending our results to a setting where agents evaluate signals knowing
the realization of other signals is another project for future work.
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A Proof of the Sufficiency Part of Proposition 2
We only consider the case in which the realization α provides the strongest individual
evidence for state a: qα(a) ≥ qαˆ(a). The other case can be dealt with analogously.
There are two further cases: we first consider the case in which β provides the strongest
individual evidence for b: qβ(b) ≥ qβˆ(b). In this case, conditions (13) and (14) become:
qα,αˆ(a) = qα(a), qβ,βˆ(a) = qβ(a). (46)
We now argue that signal s˜2 does not affect the decision maker’s belief if he has observed
signal s˜1. Indeed, if the realization (α, βˆ) has strictly positive probability in some state,
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then since qα(a) is a convex combination of qα,s2(a), s2 ∈ {αˆ, βˆ}, the left equality above
implies that qα,βˆ(b) = qα(b). Moreover, if (α, βˆ) has zero probability in all states, then
clearly the decision maker maintains his belief after having observed the realization α
with probability 1. In sum, we have shown that the probability that a realization of
signal s˜2 changes the decision maker’s belief if realization α of signal s˜1 has been observed
is zero. Symmetrically, the probability that a realization of signal s˜2 changes the decision
maker’s belief if realization β of signal s˜1 has been observed is zero. But this means that
the marginal value of signal s˜2, if signal s˜1 is available, is zero in all decision problems.
Hence, signals are substitutes.
We next consider the case qβˆ(b) ≥ qβ(b). In this case, conditions (13) and (14) become:
qα,αˆ(a) = qα(a), qβ,βˆ(b) = qβˆ(b). (47)
We first argue that this implies
p12,a(α, βˆ) = p12,b(α, βˆ) = 0. (48)
Indeed, suppose the contrary were true. Then because for i, j, qsi(a) is a convex combi-
nation of qsi,sj(a), sj ∈ Sj, (47) would imply that qα,βˆ(a) = qα(a), and qα,βˆ(a) = qβˆ(a),
a contradiction to our assumption that realization α indicates state a and realization βˆ
indicates state b.
We now demonstrate that signals are substitutes. Suppose first that the realization
(β, αˆ) has zero probability in all states. Then (48) implies that signals are perfectly
correlated. Therefore, the probability that a realization of one signal changes the decision
maker’s belief if the other signal is available is zero. Hence, signals are substitutes.
Suppose next that (β, αˆ) has strictly positive probability in some state. (47) together
with the fact that for i, j, qsi(a) is a convex combination of qsi,sj(a), sj ∈ Sj and the
assumption that α provides the strongest and βˆ the weakest individual evidence for state
a implies the ordering:
qβ,βˆ(a) = qβˆ(a) ≤ qβ(a) ≤ qβ,αˆ(a) ≤ qαˆ(a) ≤ qα(a) = qα,αˆ(a). (49)
We now use Lemma 1 to demonstrate that signals are substitutes. By Lemma 1, it is
sufficient to verify that signals are substitutes in all two action problems of Figure 5 for
all x ∈ (0, 1). We show that for any x there is a signal s˜i so that V12(A, u)− Vi(A, u) = 0
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holds for the two action decision problem (A, u) with parameter x.
• x ≤ qβ,βˆ(a) or x ≥ qα,αˆ(a): Then all realizations of (s˜1, s˜2), s˜1, s˜2 induce the same
optimal action, so that V12(A, u)− V1(A, u) = V12(A, u)− V2(A, u) = 0.
• x ∈ (qβ,βˆ(a), qβ,αˆ(a)]: Then the probability that a realization of signal s˜1 moves the
decision maker’s belief when realization βˆ of signal s˜2 has been observed is zero,
and no realization of signal s˜1 changes the optimal action if realization αˆ of signal
s˜2 has already been observed. Therefore, V12(A, u)− V2(A, u) = 0.
• x ∈ (qβ,αˆ(a), qα,αˆ(a)]: Then the probability that a realization of signal s˜2 moves the
decision maker’s belief if realization α of signal s˜1 has been observed is zero, and no
realization of signal s˜2 changes the optimal action if realization β of signal s˜1 has
already been observed. Therefore, V12(A, u)− V1(A, u) = 0.
B Proof of the Sufficiency Part of Proposition 3
We begin with the observation that the conditions in Proposition 3 imply that all signal
realizations have strictly positive prior probability. Suppose, for example, (15) were true
and p¯12(α, βˆ) = 0. Then qα(a) = qα,αˆ(a) ≤ pi(a) which would contradict our assumption
that qα(a) > pi(a). The argument can be completed by repeating this step a number of
times.
By Lemma 1, it suffices to verify complementarity for all two action problems described
in Figure 5. Below, we shall assume that x ≤ 0.5 = pi(a). If x ≤ 0.5, then it is optimal
under the prior belief to choose B. We shall assume that qβ(a) < x and qβˆ(a) < x so that
after observing β or βˆ it is strictly optimal to choose T . If this were not true, at least
one of the signals would by itself never provide a strict incentive to switch away from
the action that maximizes expected utility under the prior, and thus this signal by itself
would have zero value. Signals would then trivially be complements.
A signal has positive value by itself if it sometimes induces the decision maker to
switch to T , and the value of the signal is the expected utility increase arising from these
switches. If the decision maker attaches probability q(a) < x to state a, and switches
from B to T , then the increase in expected utility is:
(1− q(a))x− q(a)(1− x) = x− q(a). (50)
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Observing a second signal realization sometimes induces the decision maker to switch
back from T to B. If some signal observation induces the decision maker to hold beliefs
q(a) > x, and to switch from T to B, then the increase in expected utility is:
q(a)(1− x)− (1− q(a))x = q(a)− x. (51)
Building on these considerations, we can now calculate for the two action decision
problem (A, u) that corresponds to the parameter value x:
V2(A, u)− V∅(A, u) = p¯2(βˆ)[x− qβˆ(a)]
= p¯12(β, βˆ)[x− qβ,βˆ(a)] + p¯12(α, βˆ)[x− qα,βˆ(a)]. (52)
The first line uses the assumption qβˆ(a) < x. The first and the second line are equal
because the expected value of the posterior belief after observing both signal realizations,
taking expected values over the realizations of signal 1, is the posterior belief after ob-
serving the realization of signal 2 only. We next compute the marginal value of signal s˜2
when signal s˜1 is available:
V12(A, u)− V1(A, u) = p¯12(β, αˆ)[qβ,αˆ(a)− x]+ + p¯12(β, βˆ)[qβ,βˆ(a)− x]+
+p¯12(α, αˆ)[x− qα,αˆ(a)]+ + p¯12(α, βˆ)[x− qα,βˆ(a)]+. (53)
Here, we use for any real number z the following notation: z+ ≡ z if z ≥ 0, and z+ ≡ 0
if z < 0. We have also made use of our assumption qβ(a) < x.
We now prove first that (15) implies that signals are complements. Condition (15)
implies that qβ,αˆ(a) > 0.5 > x because otherwise we could not have qαˆ(a) > 0.5 = pi(a).
Thus,
V12(A, u)− V1(A, u) ≥ p¯12(β, αˆ)[qβ,αˆ(a)− x]. (54)
Therefore, we obtain for the difference:
V12(A, u)− V1(A, u)− (V2(A, u)− V∅(A, u))
≥ p¯12(β, αˆ)[qβ,αˆ(a)− x] + p¯12(β, βˆ)[qβ,βˆ(a)− x] + p¯12(α, βˆ)[qα,βˆ(a)− x]. (55)
Now we add and subtract p¯12(α, αˆ)[qα,αˆ(a) − x] on the right hand side. Using the fact
that
∑
(s1,s2)∈S1×S2 p¯12(s1, s2)qs1,s2(a) = pi(a) = 0.5, the right hand side of (55) becomes
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equal to
0.5− x− p¯12(α, αˆ)[qα,αˆ(a)− x] ≥ 0.5− x− p¯12(α, αˆ)[0.5− x] ≥ 0. (56)
The first inequality follows because qα,αˆ(a) ≤ 0.5 by (15). The second inequality follows
because x ≤ 0.5 and since p¯12(α, αˆ) < 1. This establishes that (15) implies that signals
are complements.
We next prove that (16) implies that signals are complements. Condition (16) implies:
qβ,βˆ(a) ≥ pi(a) = 0.5 ≥ x, and hence we have:
V12(A, u)− V1(A, u) ≥ p¯12(β, βˆ)[qβ,βˆ(a)− x] + p¯12(α, βˆ)[x− qα,βˆ(a)]+. (57)
Thus,
V12(A, u)− V1(A, u)− (V2(A, u)− V∅(A, u))
≥ p¯12(β, βˆ)[qβ,βˆ(a)− x] + p¯12(α, βˆ)[x− qα,βˆ(a)]+
+p¯12(β, βˆ)[qβ,βˆ(a)− x] + p¯12(α, βˆ)[qα,βˆ(a)− x] ≥ 0. (58)
The sum in (58) is non-negative since qβ,βˆ(a) ≥ pi(a) = 0.5 ≥ x by (16), and because the
sum of the second and the fourth term is always non-negative. Thus we have again shown
that signals are complements.
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